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1. Introduction
One of the most important developments in the growth literature of the last decade
is the enhanced appreciation of the role that the misallocation of resources plays
in helping us understand income differences across countries. Given an economy’s
stock of physical capital, labor, human capital, and knowledge, the way in which
those aggregate quantities ofinputs areallocated acrossﬁrms andindustries —and
even potentially within ﬁrms — determines the economy’s overall level of produc-
tion. Thebestallocationwillmaximizewelfareand,inasensethatcanbemadepre-
cise, output itself in the long run. Other allocations result in lower levels of output
and therefore show up in the aggregate as a lower level of total factor productivity
(TFP).
In some broad sense, this is anold idea with many antecedents. In the real busi-
ness cycle literature, for example, it is commonly appreciated that tax distortions or
regulations mayshow upasTFPshocks. Chari,KehoeandMcGrattan(2007)follows
in this tradition.
In the literature on growth and development, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) ex-
plicitly analyze a model of misallocation among heterogeneous plants to quantify
theeffectonaggregateTFP.BanerjeeandDuﬂo(2005)arguethatthemarginalprod-
uct of capital differs widely among ﬁrms in India, potentially reducing overall out-
put. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) present empirical evidence that misallocation across
plants within 4-digit industries mayreduce TFP in manufacturing by a factor of two
to three in China and India. A large literature surrounding these papers considers
various mechanisms through which misallocation can lead to income differences.1
This paper provides my own idiosynchratic perspective on misallocation and
presents three basic points. First, I begin with an overview of misallocation. A
simple toy model illustrates how misallocation can reduce TFP, and I outline sev-
eral questions related to misallocation that might be considered in future research.
1Examples include Parente and Prescott (1999), Caselli and Gennaioli (2005), Lagos (2006), Al-
faro, Charlton and Kanczuk (2008), Buera and Shin (2008), Guner, Ventura and Xu (2008), La Porta
and Shleifer (2008), Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2009), Vollrath (2009), Midrigan and Xu
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Second, I suggest one way in which the effects of misallocation can be ampliﬁed:
through the input-output structure of the economy. Because the outputs of many
ﬁrmsareusedastheinputs ofother ﬁrms,theeffectsofmisallocation canbeampli-
ﬁed. Finally,Iprovide anoverviewoftheinput-output structure oftheUnitedStates
and 34 other economies, albeit at a fairly high level of aggregation. In addition to
supporting the basic point that the ampliﬁcation associatedwith input-output eco-
nomics can be quantitatively important, this overview suggests what I think is a
remarkable similarity in the input-output structures of diverse economies. Under-
standing whether this really is the case, why it may be so, and what implications it
entails is another useful area for future research.
2. Misallocation
This section provides an overview of the consequences of the misallocation of re-
sources.
2.1. Misallocation and TFP
We begin by presenting a simple example that illustrates the basic point of the mis-
allocation literature: misallocation reduces TFP.
Consider an economy in which the two key produced goods are steel and lattes:
Production: Xsteel = Lsteel, Xlatte = Llatte
Resource constraint: Lsteel + Llatte = ¯ L
GDP (aggregation): Y = X
1/2
steelX
1/2
latte
One unit of labor can produce either a unit of steel or a cup of latte. The econ-
omy is endowed with ¯ L units of labor. And we assume lattes and steel combine in a
Cobb-Douglasfashiontogenerateaﬁnalgood. This lastequationcouldbereplaced
by a utility function, but then one would have to specify prices in order to aggregate
the two goods; the approach here is simpler.4 CHARLES I. JONES
Obviously, the only allocative decision that has to be made is how much labor to
employproducing steelversuslattes. Letx ≡ Lsteel/¯ Ldenote theallocation oflabor.
This could be determined by perfectly competitive markets, by a social planner, by
markets distorted by taxes, or in any number of different ways.
Solving for GDP given the allocation yields
Y = A(x)¯ L,
where TFP, A(x), is given by
A(x) =
 
x(1 − x).
These two equations summarize in a simple way one of the key points of the recent
literature on misallocation: the misallocation of resources reduces TFP. As is clear
giventhe symmetryofthe setup, theoptimal allocation oflabor inthis simpleecon-
omyfeaturesx∗ = 1/2. Anydeparture from this allocation —putting eithertoo little
or too much labor into making steel — reduces TFP and therefore GDP. More gen-
erally, if the exponents in the production function were σ and 1 − σ instead of 1/2,
then TFP would simply be A(x) = xσ(1 − x)1−σ; this expression will be useful later.
The effects of misallocation are shown graphically in Figure 1.
This ﬁgure illustrates another key point: small departures from the optimal al-
location of labor have tiny effects on TFP (an application of the envelope theorem),
but signiﬁcant misallocation can have very large effects. Given the large income
differences that we see across countries, this possibility is appealing.
However,morecarefulconsideration ofFigure1indicatesthatthissimplemodel
has what may be an important limitation: in the presence of signiﬁcant misalloca-
tion, a small improvement in the allocation of resources will have a large impact on
TFP.
Contrast this with a hypothetical example like that in Figure 2. The dashed line
in the ﬁgure repeats the effect of misallocation on TFP from Figure 1, while the new
solid line depicts an alternative. It seems to me that the alternative better captures
the world we live in. As before, small misallocation has small effects and large mis-MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 5
Figure 1: Misallocation Reduces TFP
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allocation has large effects. Now, however, an intermediate degree of misallocation
can have large effects as well (e.g. if the allocation of labor has x = 1/4, TFP is less
than 1/4 rather than larger than 1/4). Moreover, with a large degree of misalloca-
tion, the effect on TFP of an improved allocation of resources is small: reforms in
manycaseswouldhavesmalleffects. Growthmiracleswouldbelesscommoninthe
second world and would be more likely to occur among countries with an interme-
diate degree of distortions than a large degree of distortions. This kind of structure
may even help explain the “twin peaks” structure of the world income distribution
emphasized by Quah (1996).
One of the challenges going forward in models of misallocation is — perhaps
— to ensure that they capture some of the features of Figure 2 rather than some of
the limitations in Figure 1. Jones (2011) explores the possibility that the O-ring style
complementarity of Kremer (1993) may help in this regard.
This simple example is useful in illustrating how misallocation reduces TFP, but
itfailsto captureone ofthe points emphasizedinthe recentliterature on misalloca-6 CHARLES I. JONES
Figure 2: An Alternative Model of Misallocation?
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tion. In the example, misallocation is across sectors: we may have too much or too
little steel relative to what is optimal. The recent literature often emphasizes mis-
allocation at a more microeconomic level: within the steel sector, there are some
plants that are good at making steel and others that are less good. Misallocation
may involve giving the less efﬁcient plants too many resources. Clearly both kinds
ofmisallocation(acrossandwithinsectors)canbeimportant. Onemightevenpush
this insight further: Why are some plants more productive than others? Maybe be-
cause of the misallocation of resources within plants. Organizing a plant and pro-
ducing output involve an enormous number of decisions, and these decisions may
be distorted or made incorrectly because of misallocation: maybe the plant man-
ageris not the best person for the job (Caselliand Gennaioli, 2005), maybe the most
talented workers within the plant are not promoted to the appropriate positions,
maybe the incentives for the workers to produce efﬁciently are not present (Lazear,
2000), maybe unionization and job protection leads the ﬁrm to use too much labor
inappropriately (Schmitz, 2005) and so on.MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 7
2.2. Misallocation and Ideas
Next, I wish to consider the interaction between two key themes of the literature on
economic growth, the most recent theme of misallocation and the older theme of
ideas. Much of the recent literature studies misallocation in neoclassical models in
which all inputs are rival. Yet it is surely the case that efforts toward creating and
using ideas are distorted as well. How can one think about this?
One useful starting place is the Romer (1990) variety model. The economy uses
a range of capital goods — whose measure is At — to produce. Misallocation can
take two forms: the capital goods could be used in the wrong amount or the range
of goods that are available may be incorrect. Of course, this second form can be
viewed as a special case of the ﬁrst form, where the quantity used is set equal to
zero. In fact, Romer (1994) explored this latter option and argued that it could have
large effects.
A clear advantage of this approach is that the variety framework is straightfor-
ward to analyze, and misallocation in the presence of ideas turns out to be not that
different from misallocation with rival inputs.
A puzzle is that when calibrated, the variety approach tends to yield relatively
small effects. In particular, it is common to calibrate the elasticity of substitution
among varieties to markups. With small markups, this elasticity is often large. And
when varieties are good substitutes, it is just not that costly to be using the “wrong”
variety. A recent example along these lines is Broda and Weinstein (2006). They
use a variety model to study the welfare gains from imports of new varieties be-
tween 1972 and 2001. Over this thirty year period, they estimate that the number of
imported product varieties increased by a factor of three, but the gain to U.S. con-
sumersfrom havingaccessto thesevarieties wasjust2.6percentof GDP.(Ofcourse,
given the relatively small import share in the United States,this number maynot be
so small after all.)
An open question for future research is the extent to which misallocation and
ideas interact in important ways. It may be that a quality-ladder approach a la
Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) can yield better re-8 CHARLES I. JONES
sults.
2.3. Key Questions
At some basic level, there are only two fundamental reasons for income differences
across countries in the long run. Either economies have different production pos-
sibilities or they have different allocations. In the case of production possibilities,
once we have endogenized ideas, the only remaining reason for differences is geo-
graphic. Maybe some pieces of land are more conducive to production than others.
While there is probably something to this explanation, my current understanding
is that these effects are small relative to the large income differences we see across
countries. Probably the single most persuasive evidence on this point is the classic
Mancur Olson (1996) argument: the large income difference that has emerged be-
tween North and South Korea over the last half century, for example, is surely not
due to geography.2
This leaves differences in the allocation of resources to explain the bulk of in-
come differences across countries. Given the production possibilities, allocations
canthendifferfortworeasons: differences inpreferences andmisallocation. Again,
there is probably something to the preference story (this seems like a plausible part
of the explanation for the difference between the European and American alloca-
tion of resources). But at some basic level, people are people and any difference in
preferences is probably itself an endogenous outcome.
This argument, then, suggests that all that is left, fundamentally, to explain dif-
ferences in incomes across countries is misallocation, working both through tra-
ditional inputs like capital and labor and also through ideas. Income differences
across countries result almost entirely from the misallocation of resources.
And yet to say misallocation is everything is perhaps not to say very much after
all. In particular, three additional questions seem pertinent:
1. What is the nature of the misallocation? Are certain inputs misallocated more
2Obviously, there is a large literature debating this question; for example, see Gallup, Sachs and
Mellinger (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002).MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 9
than others? Is the misallocation related to ideas special in any way relative
to the misallocation of traditional inputs? How signiﬁcant is misallocation
within sectors or between sectors or even within plants? How much misal-
location is there in the richest countries?
2. How precisely does the misallocation of resources lead to 50-fold income dif-
ferences? A simple version of this question is illustrated by the differences we
sawbackinFigures 1and2. Intheﬁrstcase,large income differencesrequired
extreme forms of misallocation, and small improvements in the allocation of
resources would have large effects on income. In the second, neither of these
points is necessarily true. Why does a given amount of misallocation lead to
such large income differences? And why are income differences across coun-
tries generally rising over time?
3. Why is there misallocation, and what can be done about it? This last question
takes us into the realm of political economy. The literature on political econ-
omy and growth/development has been extremely active in the last decade;
see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) for an excellent overview. The
state-of-the-artinthatliteraturesuggeststhatmisallocationistheequilibrium
outcome of a political process interacting with institutions and the distribu-
tion of resources (including physical capital, human capital, ideas, and natu-
ral resources). It is, evidently, not in the economic interests of the ruling elite
to improve the allocation of resources, despite the potentially enormous in-
crease in the size of the economic pie that is possible in the long run.
The distinction between Figures 1 and 2 is helpful in this respect and illus-
trates the important interaction that occurs between the production possibil-
ities ofthe economy andthe political process. InFigure 1it is harderto under-
stand why improvements in the allocation of resources would not take place
inthemostdistortedcountriesbecausetheimmediategainsaresolarge. Such
failures are easier to comprehend in an economy like Figure 2, where the im-
mediate gains may be much smaller.
The remainder of this paper takes a much narrower focus and explores one di-10 CHARLES I. JONES
mension of these key questions about misallocation. In particular, it focuses on the
production possibilities and seeks to understand why a given amount of misalloca-
tion can lead to large income differences rather than small income differences.
3. Input-Output Economics
Modern economies involve very sophisticated input-output structures. Goods like
electricity, ﬁnancial services, transportation, information technology and health-
care are both inputs and outputs. A wide range of intermediate goods are used to
produce most goods in the economy, and these goods in turn are often used as in-
termediates.
Despite our intuitive recognition of this point, standard models of macroeco-
nomics and economic growth typically ignore intermediate goods.3 The conven-
tional wisdom seems to be that as long as we are concerned about overall value-
added (GDP) in the economy, we can specify the model entirely in terms of value-
added and ignore intermediate goods. Hence the neoclassical growth model.
This conventional wisdomis incorrect, and the remainder of this paper explores
some of the implications of the input-output structure of the economy for eco-
nomic growth and development.
The ﬁrst insight that emerges from thinking about intermediate goods is that
they are very similar to capital. In fact, the only difference between intermediate
goods and capital is one of short-run timing: intermediate goods can be installed
more quickly than capital and “depreciate” fully during the course of production,
while capital takes a bit longer to install and only partially depreciates during pro-
duction. From the point of view of the long run — the perspective relevant in most
of this paper — intermediate goods and capital are essentially the same. In particu-
lar, both are produced factors of production.
The keyimplications of intermediate goods for economic growth, development,
and macroeconomics arise from seeing them as another form of capital. It has long
been recognized that the share of capital in production is a fundamental determi-
3Of course, there is a signiﬁcant literature of exceptions; these will be discussed below.MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 11
nant of the quantitative predictions of macro models. When the capital share is
1/3,theintrinsic propogation mechanismoftheneoclassicalgrowth modelisweak,
convergence to the steadystate is rapid, and the model generates a small multiplier
on changes in productivity or the investment rate. In contrast, when the capital
share is higher, like 2/3, these deﬁciencies are largely remedied. A fairly large por-
tion of the literature on economic growth can be viewed as an attempt to justify
using a (broad) capital share of 2/3 when the data for (narrow) capital loudly pro-
claim that the right number empirically is only 1/3.4
As documented carefully below, the intermediate goods share of gross output is
about 1/2 across a large number of countries. The share of capital in value-added is
about 1/3, so its share in gross output is 1/6. Combining these two kinds of capital,
the share of capital-like goods in gross output is our magic number, 1/2 + 1/6 =
2/3. Incorporating intermediate goods into macroeconomic models, then, has the
potential to help us understand a range of economic phenomenon, including the
propogation of business cycle shocks and the speed of transition dynamics. These
applications will not be explored here. Instead, the main application in this paper
will be to the puzzle of understanding why misallocation leads some countries to
be 50 times richer than others, as opposed to only 10 times richer.
We begin by providing a simple example to illustrate how and why intermediate
goods lead to large multipliers. In this example, a single ﬁnal output good is usedas
the single intermediate good in the economy, so the input-output structure is very
simple. Next, we build an N-sector model of economic activity, where each sector
uses the outputs from the other sectors as intermediate goods. This model is very
similarto the original multi-sector business cycle model ofLongandPlosser(1983).
The only technological difference is that we include international trade, allowing
sectors to import intermediate goods from abroad. The substantive difference is in
4For examples of these points in various contexts, see Rebelo (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992), Cogley and Nason (1995), and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1997). Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992)make many of these points, adding human capital to boost the capital share. Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (1997)introduced “organizational capital” for the same reason. Howitt (2000) and Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) consider the accumulation of ideas, another produced factor. More re-
cently, Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) and Erosa, Koreshkova and Restuccia (2010) have resurrected
the human capital story in a more sophisticated fashion.12 CHARLES I. JONES
the application to economic growth and development.
Finally,weconnectthismodeltothewealthofinput-output datathatexist. Data
from 35 countries — including not only the currently rich countries but also Ar-
gentina, Brazil, China, and India — allows us to quantify the multiplier associated
with the input-output structure of the economy.
Before continuing, it is worth noting that there is a very important branch of
the economics literature that has studied the impact of intermediate goods. His-
torically, the input-output literature reigned in economics from the 1930s through
the 1960s and is most commonly associated with Leontief (1936) and his follow-
ers. Hirschman(1958) emphasizedtheimportance ofsectorallinkages toeconomic
development, which itself spawned a large literature. Hulten (1978) is also closely
related,showinghowintermediate goods shouldproperly beincludedingrowthac-
counting. More recently, the intermediate goods multiplier shows up most clearly
in the economic ﬂuctuations literature; see Long and Plosser (1983), Basu (1995),
Horvath (1998), Dupor (1999), Conley and Dupor (2003), Gabaix (2005), and Basu,
Fernald, Fisher and Kimball (2010). In the international trade context, Yi (2003)
argues that tariffs can multiply up in much the same way when goods get traded
multiple times during the stages of production. Ciccone (2002) is the ﬁrst modern
growth paper I know of to develop this insight, deriving a multiplier formula for
a triangular input-output structure. Jones (2011) also emphasizes the importance
of the intermediate goods multiplier, albeit for a relatively restrictive input-output
structure.
3.1. A Simple Example
A simple example is helpful for understanding how intermediate goods generate
a multiplier. Suppose gross output Qt is produced using capital Kt, labor Lt, and
intermediate goods Xt.
Qt = ¯ A
 
Kα
t L1−α
t
 1−σ Xσ
t . (1)
Grossoutput canbeusedforconsumption orinvestmentoritcanbecarriedoverto
the next period and used as an intermediate good. To keep things simple, assume aMISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 13
constant fraction ¯ x is used as an intermediate good:
Xt+1 = ¯ xQt. (2)
GDP in this economy is gross output net of spending on intermediate goods: Yt ≡
(1 − ¯ x)Qt. In a steady state with no growth, it is easy to show that GDP will be given
by
Yt = TFP · Kα
t L1−α
t , (3)
where
TFP ≡ ( ¯ A¯ xσ(1 − ¯ x)1−σ)
1
1−σ. (4)
TFP depends on the allocation of resources to intermediate goods. It will be maxi-
mized when ¯ x = σ, which is the optimal spending share on intermediates. For any
other spending share, however, TFP will be lower, and this effect will be ampliﬁed
the higher is the intermediate goods share.
Going further, let’s assume a constant fraction ¯ s of GDP is invested:
Kt+1 = ¯ sYt + (1 − δ)Kt, (5)
= ¯ s(1 − ¯ x)Qt + (1 − δ)Kt,
Assume labor is exogenous and constant.
This model features a steady state, where the level of GDP per worker yt ≡ Yt/Lt
is
y∗ ≡
Y
L
=
 
¯ A¯ xσ(1 − ¯ x)1−σ
 ¯ s
δ
 α(1−σ)  1
(1−α)(1−σ)
. (6)
A key implication of this result is that the effects of misallocation or basic pro-
ductivity differences get multiplied. In particular, consider the simple allocation
term ¯ xσ(1 − ¯ x)1−σ, familiar from our steel-and-latte economy. Now that the misal-
location applies to a produced good, its effects are ampliﬁed: there is an exponent
of 1
(1−α)(1−σ) > 1 that applies to misallocation.
To see this more simply, observe that a 1% increase in productivity ¯ A increases
output by more than 1% because of the multiplier 1
(1−α)(1−σ). In the absence of in-14 CHARLES I. JONES
termediate goods (σ = 0), this multiplier is just the familiar 1
1−α: an increase in pro-
ductivity raises output, which leads to more capital, which leads to more output,
and so on. The cumulation of this virtuous circle is 1 + α + α2 = 1
1−α.
In the presence of intermediate goods, there is an additional multiplier: higher
output leads to more intermediate goods, which raises output (and capital), and so
on. The overall multiplier is therefore 1
(1−α)(1−σ). In fact, this multiplier can also be
written as 1
1−β, where β ≡ σ +α(1−σ) is the total factor share of produced goods in
gross output, capital and interemediates here.
Quantitatively, the addition of intermediate goods has a large effect. For exam-
ple, consider the multipliers using conventional parameter values, a capital expo-
nent of α = 1/3 and an intermediate goods share of gross output of σ = 1/2. In
the absence of intermediate goods the multiplier is 1
1−α = 3/2, and a doubling of ¯ A
raises output by a factor of 23/2 = 2.8. But with intermediate goods, the multiplier
is 1
(1−α)(1−σ) = 3
2 · 2 = 3, and a doubling of ¯ A raises output by a factor of 23 = 8.
As discussed in Jones (2011), if we think of the standard neoclassical factors (like ¯ s
in the example) as generating a 4-fold difference in incomes across rich and poor
countries, then this 2-fold difference in TFP leads to an 11.3-fold difference in the
model with no intermediate goods, but to a 32-fold difference once intermediate
goods are taken into account, close to what we see in the data.5
The deeper question in this paper is whether this multiplier carries over into a
model with a rich and realistic input-output structure. Perhaps the input-output
structure in practice does not lead to these large feedback effects. Or perhaps im-
porting intermediate goods dilutes the multiplier substantially in practice. In fact,
theremainderofthispapershowsthattheseconcernsarenotimportantinpractice.
The simple “one over one minus the intermediate goods share” formula suggested
by this example turns out to be a very good approximation to the true input-output
5An implication of this reasoning that is worthy of further exploration is related to transition dy-
namics. A puzzle in the growth literature is why speeds of convergence are soslow, on the order of 2%
peryear; seeHaukandWacziarg(2004)forarecent summaryof theevidence. The standardneoclassi-
cal growthmodel with acapital shareof 1/3 leads toaspeed of convergence of about 7% per year. The
presence of intermediate goods would slow this rate down, just as it raises the multiplier. (A difﬁculty
in quantifying this effect is the question of how long it takes to produce and use intermediate goods:
one week, one month, or one year? That is, how long is a period?)MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 15
multiplier in modern economies. Moreover, we introduce distortions explicitly and
show how this same multiplier applies to misallocation.
4. PreliminaryExploration of a Full Input-Output Model
Assume the economy consists of N sectors. Each sector uses capital, labor, domes-
tic intermediate goods, and imported intermediate goods to produce gross output.
In turn, this output can be used for ﬁnal consumption or as an intermediate good
in production.
Given this general picture, we specialize to a particular structure with two goals
in mind: analytic tractability and obtaining a model that can be closely connected
to the rich input-output data. To these ends, the model augments the original Long
and Plosser (1983) business cycle model, based on Cobb-Douglas production func-
tions, by embedding it in a model with trade.
We begin by describing the economic environment and then allocate resources
using a competitive equilibrium with distortions.
4.1. The Economic Environment
Each of the N sectors produces with the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
Qi = Ai
 
K
αi
i H
1−αi
i
 1−σi−λi
d
σi1
i1 d
σi2
i2 · ... · d
σiN
iN       
domestic IG
m
λi1
i1 m
λi2
i2 · ... · m
λiN
iN       
imported IG
(7)
where i indexes the sector. Ai is an exogenous productivity term, which itself is the
product of aggregate productivity A and sectoral productivity ηi: Ai ≡ Aηi. Ki and
Hi are the quantities of physical and human capital used in sector i. Two kinds of
intermediate goods are used in production: dij is the quantity of domestic good j
used by sector i, and mij is the quantity of the imported intermediate good j used
by sector i. (We assume imported intermediate goods are different, so that they are
not perfect substitutes; this ﬁts with the empirical fact that countries both import
and produce intermediate goods in narrow 6-digit categories.) We abuse notation16 CHARLES I. JONES
by assuming there are N different intermediate goods that can be imported and by
indexing thesebyj aswell. The parametervalues inthis production function satisfy
σi ≡
 N
j=1 σij andλi ≡
 N
j=1 λij and0 < αi < 1,sothe production function features
constant returns to scale.
Each domestically produced good can be used for ﬁnal consumption, cj, or can
be used as an intermediate good:
cj +
N  
i=1
dij = Qj, j = 1,...,N. (8)
Ratherthanspecifyingautilityfunction overtheN differentconsumptiongoods
and performing a formal national income accounting exercise, it is more conve-
nient to aggregate these ﬁnal consumption goods into a single ﬁnal good through
another log-linear production function:
Y = c
β1
1 · ... · c
βN
N , (9)
where
 N
i=1 βi = 1.
This aggregate ﬁnal good can itself be used in one of two ways, as consumption
or exported to the rest of the world:
C + X = Y. (10)
It is these exports that pay for the imported intermediate goods. We think of this
(static) model as describing the long-run steady state of a model, so we impose bal-
anced trade:
X =
N  
i=1
N  
j=1
¯ pjmij, (11)
where ¯ pj is the exogenous world price of the imported intermediate goods.
Finally, we assumeﬁxed, exogenous supplies ofphysical and humancapital; theMISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 17
effects of endogenizing physical capital in the usual way are well-understood.
N  
i=1
Ki = K, (12)
N  
i=1
Hi = H. (13)
4.2. A Competitive Equilibrium with Misallocation
To allocate resources in this economy, we will focus on a competitive equilibrium
withdistortions. AsinChari,KehoeandMcGrattan(2007),HsiehandKlenow(2009),
Lagos(2006),andRestucciaandRogerson(2008), distortions atthe micro (here sec-
toral) level can aggregate up to provide differences in TFP. For simplicity, we model
these distortions as sector-speciﬁc reductions revenue, denoted τi. These distor-
tions could literally be taxes, but they could also represent any kind of policy that
favors one sector over another (regulations, special consideration for credit, and so
on). The additional insight developed here is that the misallocation associated with
these distortions gets ampliﬁed by the input-output structure of the economy.
Deﬁnition A competitive equilibrium with misallocation in this envi-
ronment is a collection of quantities C, Y , X, Qi, Ki, Hi, ci, dij, mij and
prices pj, w, and r for i = 1,...,N and j = 1,...,N such that
1. {ci}solvestheproﬁt maximizationproblem ofarepresentativeﬁrm
in the perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods market:
max
{ci}
c
β1
1 · ... · c
βN
N −
N  
i=1
pici
taking {pi} as given.
2. {dij,mij},Ki,Hi solve the proﬁt maximization problem of a repre-18 CHARLES I. JONES
sentative ﬁrm in the perfectly competitive sector i for i = 1,...,N:
max
{dij,mij},Ki,Hi
(1 − τi)piAi
 
K
αi
i H
1−αi
i
 1−σi−λi
d
σi1
i1 d
σi2
i2 · ... · d
σiN
iN m
λi1
i1 m
λi2
i2 · ... · m
λiN
iN
−
N  
j=1
pjdij −
N  
j=1
¯ pjmij − rKi − wHi,
taking {pi} as given (τi, Ai, and ¯ pj are exogenous).
3. Markets clear
(a) r clears the capital market:
 N
i=1 Ki = K
(b) w clears the labor market:
 N
i=1 Hi = H
(c) pj clears the sector j market: cj +
 N
i=1 dij = Qj
4. Balanced trade pins down X:
X =
N  
i=1
N  
j=1
¯ pjmij.
5. Production functions for Qi and Y :
Qi = Ai
 
K
αi
i H
1−αi
i
 1−σi−λi
d
σi1
i1 d
σi2
i2 · ... · d
σiN
iN m
λi1
i1 m
λi2
i2 · ... · m
λiN
iN
Y = c
β1
1 · ... · c
βN
N .
6. Consumption is the residual:
C + X = Y.
Countingloosely,thereare12equilibriumobjectstobedeterminedand12equa-
tions implicit in this equilibrium deﬁnition. Hiding behind the last equation is the
fact that the revenues from distortions are assumed to be rebated lump sum to
households. Because of balanced trade, however, there is no decision for house-
holds to make regarding ﬁnal consumption C, and it is simply determined as theMISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 19
residual of ﬁnal output less exports.6
4.3. Solving
In solving for the equilibrium of the model, it is useful to deﬁne some notation in-
volving linear algebra. This is summarized in Table 1. Then the following proposi-
tion characterizes the equilibrium (all proofs are given in the appendix):
Proposition1 (Solution for Y and C) In the competitive equilibrium with misallo-
cation, the solution for total production of the aggregate ﬁnal good is
Y = A˜ µK˜ αH1−˜ αǫ, (14)
where the following notation applies:
 ′ ≡
β′(I−B)−1
1−β′(I−B)−1λ, (N × 1 vector of multipliers)
˜   ≡  ′1
˜ α ≡  ′δK
ω ≡
β′ωc+β′(I−B)−1ωq
1−β′(I−B)−1λ
logǫ ≡ ω +  ′¯ η.
Moreover,becausetradeisbalanced,GDPforthiseconomyisgivenbyC,whichequals
C = Y

1 −
N  
i=1
N  
j=1
(1 − τi)γiλij

. (15)
There are several points of this proposition that merit discussion. First, and
not surprisingly, our N-sector Cobb-Douglas model aggregates up to yield a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate production function. More interestingly, aggregate TFP depends
on both sectoral TFPs and the underlying distortions. This latter point requires dig-
ging into the ǫ term, where distortions then enter in two places. Distortions enter
6Given Walras’ Law, this equation could be replaced by C = wH + rK + T, where T is the lump
sum rebate of the revenue obtained by the distortion; notice that all production is either consumed
or exported.20 CHARLES I. JONES
Table 1: Notation for Solving the Model
Typical
Notation Element Comment
Matrices (N × N):
B σij The input-output matrix of intermediate good shares.
¯ B (1 − τi)σij Thematrix ofintermediategood exponents, adjustedfor
distortions.
I — Identity matrix.
Vectors (N × 1):
1 1 Vector of ones.
β βi Vector of exponents in ﬁnal goods production.
γ γi γ ≡ (I − ¯ B′)−1β; “Domar” shares:
piQi
Y = γi
λ λi Vector of import shares, λi ≡
 N
j=1 λij.
δK αi(1 − σi − λi) Production elasticities for Ki
δH (1 − αi)(1 − σi − λi) Production elasticities for Hi
θK
δKiγi PN
j=1(1−τj)δKjγj Solution: Ki/K = (1 − τi)θKi
θH
δHiγi PN
j=1(1−τj)δHjγj Solution: Hi/H = (1 − τi)θHi
ωK δKi logθKi Sectoral allocation term for Ki
ωH δHi logθHi Sectoral allocation term for Hi
ωd
 N
j=1 σij log(σijγi/γj) Sectoral allocation term for dij
ωm
 N
j=1 λij log(λijγi/¯ pj) Sectoral allocation term for mij
ωq ωKi + ωHi + ωdi + ωmi Sum of allocation terms
ωc log(βi/γi) Consumption allocation term
¯ η log(ηi(1 − τi)) Sectoral productivity, adjusted for distortionsMISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 21
directly through ¯ η, which is a vector of sectoral productivities, adjusted for distor-
tion rates; this is the usual sense in which distortions “directly” affect productivity.
Distortions also enter indirectly through the allocation terms, captured by ω. We
will return later to the effect of distortions.
The second result to note is the presence of the input-output multiplier, re-
ﬂected by  . According to the proposition, this vector of multipliers is given by
 ′ ≡
β′(I − B)−1
1 − β′(I − B)−1λ
. (16)
Let’s break this down piece by piece, since it is one of the essential results of the
paper.
The matrix L ≡ (I − B)−1 is known as the Leontief inverse. The typical element
ℓij ofthis matrixcanbe interpreted in the following way: (ignoring trade for the mo-
ment) a 1% increase in productivity in sector j raises output in sector i by ℓij%. This
result takes into account all the indirect effects at work in the model. For example,
raising productivity in the electricity sector makes banking more efﬁcient and this
inturnraisesoutputintheconstruction industry. TheLeontiefinverseincorporates
these indirect effects. (Notice that it is the matrix equivalent of 1/1 − σ.)
Multiplying this matrix by the vector of value-added weights in β leads to β′(I −
B)−1 =
 N
i=1 βiℓij. That is, we add up the effects of sector j on all the other sectors
in the economy, weighting by their shares of value-added. The typical element of
this multiplier matrix then reveals how a change in productivity in sector j affects
overall value-added in the economy.
This would be precisely correct if λij were zero — that is, in the absence of trade.
In the presense of trade, this multiplier gets adjusted by the factor 1/(1 − β′(I −
B)−1λ). We will discuss this factor in more detail below, but for now it is enough to
note that this factor is larger than one: trade strengthens the multiplier rather than
attenuating it.
The elasticity of ﬁnal output with respect to aggregate TFP is ˜   ≡  ′1. That is,
we add up all the multipliers in   since an increase in aggregate TFP affects not just
sector j but all the sectors.22 CHARLES I. JONES
A ﬁnal remark about Proposition 1 concerns the capital exponent in the aggre-
gate production function, ˜ α ≡  ′δK. RecallthatδK is the vectorofcapital exponents
αi(1 − σi − λi). The aggregate exponent is therefore a weighted average of the sec-
toral capital shares, where the weights depend on the intermediate good shares.
This remark will make even more sense after the next proposition.
5. Special Cases, To Build Intuition
5.1. The Multiplier in a Special Case
The linear algebra formula is a useful theoretical result and will prove convenient
when we apply the model to the rich input-output data that exists. However, ana-
lyzing a special case can be helpful in obtaining intuition for how the model works.
Consider the following special case. Suppose all sectors have the same cumu-
lative elasticities of output with respect to domestic and imported intermediate
goods, although the composition across sectors is allowed to vary. For example,
one sector may use a lot of electricity and steel, while another sector uses a lot of
ﬁnancial services and information technology. The composition can vary across
sectors, but suppose each sector spends 50 percent of its revenue on intermediate
goods. What does the multiplier look like in a case like this?
The following proposition provides the answer. In fact, it allows for imported
intermediategoodsaswell(wheretheoverallsharespentonthesegoodsisthesame
in each sector):
Proposition2 (Multiplier in a special case) Assume σi ≡
 N
j=1 σij = ˆ σ and λi ≡
 N
j=1 λij = ˆ λ for all i, where ˆ σ and ˆ λ are positive scalars whose sum is less than one,
and deﬁne ¯ σ ≡ ˆ σ + ˆ λ to be the total intermediate goods share. Then
∂ logY
∂ logA
=  ′1 =
β′(I − B)−11
1 − β′(I − B)−1λ
=
1
1 − ¯ σ
.
This special case makes two general points about the model. First, the “sparse-
ness” of the input-output matrix B is not especially important. For example, ourMISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 23
special case includes a “clock” structure, where every sector uses as an input only
the good produced by the sector above it. It also includes the case where every sec-
tor uses only its own output. In both of these cases, the input-output matrix is very
sparse, with zeros almost everywhere. Yet the overall multiplier remains equal to
one over one minus the intermediate goods share. This special case suggests that if
the overall intermediate goods share is about 1/2, we shouldn’t be surprised to ﬁnd
a multiplier of about 2. This intuition will be conﬁrmed in the next section when we
turn to quantitative results.
The second key point made in this proposition is that the intuition that imports
would dilute the multiplier is a red herring. In fact, there is no dilution at all: in
the proposition, it is the overall intermediate goods share ¯ σ ≡ ˆ σ + ˆ λ that matters
for the multiplier, and the composition between domestic and imported goods is
completely irrelevant.
Why is this the case? The answer is that we have imposed balanced trade in
our (long run) model. Therefore exports are used to “produce” imports. A higher
productivity in the domestic computer chip sector raises overall exports, which in
turnincreasesimports,sothevirtuous circle isnotbrokenbythepresenceoftrade.7
5.2. Symmetry and Distortions
Our second special case allows us to study the multiplier associated with distor-
tions. First, we consider a world where the intermediate good shares of production
are the same in every sector and there is a symmetric distortion at rate τi = ¯ τ. In
this case, GDP in the economy is given by the following proposition:
Proposition3 (Symmetry and Distortions) Suppose σij = ˆ σ/N, λij = ˆ λ/N, βi =
1/N, αi = α, and τi = ¯ τ. Then
logC = Constant +
¯ σ
1 − ¯ σ
log(1 − ¯ τ) + log(1 − ¯ σ(1 − ¯ τ)), (17)
7This assumption of balanced trade is the key difference that makes the intuition from the Keyne-
sianbusinesscyclemodel inappropriate. In thebusiness cyclecontext, anincreasein exports leads to
a trade surplus and does not increase imports.24 CHARLES I. JONES
Figure 3: Consumption versus the Average Distortion, ¯ τ
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
¯ τ
                      Consumption,  C
Note: This example is drawn for ¯ σ = 1/2. Notice the similarity to Figure 1.
where ¯ σ ≡ (ˆ σ + ˆ λ) denotes the total intermediate goods share, and Constant is a
collection of terms that do not depend on ¯ τ. Moreover, consumption is an inverse-U
shaped function of the distortion rate, with a peak that occurs at ¯ τ = 0.
An example of this proposition is shown in Figure 3. Notice that the effect of a
change in the distortion rate on GDP depends essentially on ¯ σ. If there are no inter-
mediate goods in this economy, output distortions have no effect. This is because
the distortions here represent a violation of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) dic-
tum of “no taxation of intermediate goods.” In our (current) setup, K and H are
non-produced factors, so a symmetric tax does not distort the allocation of capital.
Thekeydistortion isbetweenconsumptionandintermediategoods. Agoodthat
gets consumed suffers the distortion only once when the good is produced; a good
that is used as an intermediate gets distorted when it is ﬁrst produced then again
when it is used as an intermediate. Since a constant fraction of output is consumed
and the rest is used as an intermediate good, this process suffers from the vicious
cycle of the multiplier.MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 25
Symmetric distortions affect GDP through the two terms in equation (17). The
ﬁrst term is the direct effect, where distortions enter the model very much like pro-
ductivity: recallthatboth1−τi andAi aresubjecttothemultipliereffectthroughthe
ǫ term in Proposition 1. The second term mitigates this effect somewhat and cap-
tures the indirect effect whereby higher distortions raise consumption (by reducing
the purchase of intermediate goods).
5.3. Symmetry with Random Distortions
Our ﬁnal special case allows us to consider variation in distortions across sectors.
Suppose everything in the model other than distortions is symmetric, and allow
distortions to be a log-normally distributed random variable:
Proposition4 (Symmetry with Random Distortions) Supposeσij = ˆ σ/N,λij = ˆ λ/N,
and βi = 1/N, and let ¯ σ ≡ ˆ σ+ ˆ λ. Assume log(1−τi) ∼ N(θ,v2) and let 1− ¯ τ ≡ eθ+ 1
2v2
reﬂect the average distortion. Then
plimN→∞ logC =Constant +
¯ σ
1 − ¯ σ
· (1 − ¯ τ)
+ log(1 − ¯ σ(1 − ¯ τ)) −
1
1 − ¯ σ
·
1
2
· v2,
where Constant is a collection of terms that do not depend on θ or v2. Moreover, con-
sumption is maximized when there are no distortions.
In terms of the mean effect of distortions, this result is identical to the previous
one. Now, however, we have an additional result related to the variance of distor-
tions across sectors. In particular, a higher variance of distortions reduces GDP,
even in the absence of intermediate goods, since random distortions will distort
the allocation of capital and labor across sectors. However, the variance term itself
is subject to the now-familiar multiplier effect associated with 1/1 − ¯ σ. A higher
variance of distortions is more costly in an economy with intermediate goods. This
makes sense: the ﬁrst best in this economy is to have no distortions. Either a con-
stant tax or a random tax distorts the allocation of resources and reduces GDP. The26 CHARLES I. JONES
Figure 4: Consumption versus the Standard Deviation of Distortions
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Note: This example is drawn for ¯ τ = 0.
magnitude of the distortion depends on the Diamond-Mirrlees effect: how impor-
tant intermediate goods are in production. An example is illustrated in Figure 4.
5.4. Random Distortions with a General I-O Structure
So far, I have lacked the right combination of time, talent, and insight to derive a
moregeneralresultfortheeffectoflog-normaldistortions inthepresenceofthefull
input-output structure, though I suspect that good results are possible along these
lines. The intuition from the previous propositions strongly suggests that some-
thing like the general multiplier ˜   will continue to play a crucial role. For the empir-
ical applications that follow, I will therefore focus on this general multiplier.MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 27
6. Quantitative Analysis
We now turntothe rich input-output data thatexists,both forthe UnitedStatesand
for many other countries. This data allows us to calculate aggregate and sectoral
multipliers and to study the effect of sectoral distortions on aggregate GDP. First,
we use the six-digit level data available from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
for the United States in 1997. Then we turn to the OECD Input-Output Database,
which contains data for 48 industries and 35 countries.
6.1. The U.S. Input-Output Data, 480 Industries
Figure 5 shows something very close to the B matrix for the United States, using
the 480 commodities in the BEA’s 1997 benchmark input-output data. Actually, we
plot the matrix of σij + λij instead, so that the entries show the overall exponents
on intermediate goods used in producing each of the 480 goods. A contour plot
method is used, showing only those shares greater than 2%, 4%, and 8%.
Three points standout inthe ﬁgure. First, there is astrong diagonal. Second, the
matrix is relatively sparse. Finally, there are a few key exceptions to this sparseness:
a few key goods are used by a large number of industries in a signiﬁcant way. These
include wholesale trade, trucking, management of companies, real estate, paper-
board products, and iron and steel mills.
Table2reportssomebasicstatisticsoftheU.S.input-outputmatrixthathelpput
these visual conclusions in context. Even though the diagonal elements were im-
portant visually, the table makes the point that these elements are typically small:
the mean of them is only 3.3% and the median is only 1.0%. This is true despite
the fact that the typical industry pays a large share of its gross output to intermedi-
ate goods: 56.4% at the mean. The industry at the 75th percentile pays out about
two-thirds of its revenue to intermediate goods, while even the industry at the 25th
percentile pays nearly half. Along these lines, it is worth noting that even though
just 0.13% of the elements of the input-output matrix exceed 10 percent, this is still
288 elements over all — on average about once for every two sectors. Similarly, 83
of the entries are greater than 20 percent. As the bottom of the table shows, the28 CHARLES I. JONES
Figure 5: The U.S. Input-Output Matrix, 1997 (480 Industries)
The good being used
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
p
u
t
Wholesale
 trade (381)
Trucking
(385)
Management of
Companies (431)
Real Estate
   (411)
Iron & Steel
  Mills (201)
Paperboard
products (125)
Ag/Mi/Con |  −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Manufacturing −−−−−−−−−−−−−−− | −−− Services −−−
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Note: The plot shows the matrix [σij + λij], that is, the matrix of intermediate good
shares for 480 industries. A contour plot method is used, showing only those shares
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Table 2: Statistics of the U.S. Input-Output Matrix, 1997 (480 Industries)
Properties of the diagonal elements
Mean: 0.033
75th percentile: 0.045
50th percentile: 0.010
25th percentile: 0.002
Fraction of all elements that are
equal to zero: 0.510
below 0.1 percent: 0.882
below 0.5 percent: 0.958
below 1.0 percent: 0.979
below 5.0 percent: 0.996
above 10 percent: 0.0013
above 20 percent: 0.0004
above 50 percent: 0.0000
Mean of σi + λi: 0.564
75th percentile: 0.666
50th percentile: 0.558
25th percentile: 0.477
Aggregate Multipliers
Domestic, β′(I − B)−11 1.61
Imports, 1/(1 − β′(I − B)−1λ) 1.03
Overall, ˜   1.65
Actual intermediate goods share: 0.434
“As if” intermediate goods share: 0.394
Note: Except where noted, staistics are reported for the overall input-
output matrix of σij + λij.30 CHARLES I. JONES
overall intermediate goods share for the U.S. economy is about 43.4%: service in-
dustries are more important as a share of value-added, and these industries have
lower intermediate goods shares.
The last part of the table computes the aggregate multiplier using the 6-digit
input-output data. The overall mutliplier is 1.65. This number is the product of a
domestic multiplier of 1.61 (that would obtain if no intermediate goods were im-
ported), and an import multiplier of 1.03. Imports are relatively unimportant in the
multiplier.
To what extent is the simple 1
1−¯ σ formula accurate? The multiplier of 1.65 would
result from this formula if the intermediate goods share were 0.394. In fact, the
intermediate goods share using this 6-digit data is 0.434. This simple aggregate for-
mula appears to give a good approximation to the result found by computing the
480x480 Leontief inverse, although there is a small degree of dilution: applying the
formula to the 0.434 share suggests a multiplier that overstates the truth by about
ten percent.
6.2. The OECD Input-Output Data, 48 Industries
The 2006 edition of the OECD Input-Output Database contains input-output data
for35countries and48industries,typicallyfortheyear2000. Inaddition tocovering
OECD countries, the data also include some poor and middle-income countries,
such as China, India, Argentina, Brazil, and Russia.
Figure 6 shows the input-output matrix for the United States at this higher level
of aggregation. The pattern at the more detailed level of aggregation of a sparse
matrix with a strong diagonal and just a few goods that are used widely is repeated
at this higher level of aggregation.
Oneofthenice featuresoftheOECD dataisthatwecanconsider thequestionof
how much the input-output structure of an economy differs across countries. The
general and perhaps surprising answer that one obtains is “not much.” Figure 7
shows the input-output matrix for two countries, Japan and China, as an example.
The matrix for Japan looks very much like the matrix for the United States. ThisMISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 31
Figure 6: The U.S. Input-Output Matrix, 2000 (48 Industries)
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Figure 7: Input-Output Matrix in Japan and China (48 Industries)
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is true more generally, especially for the richer countries in the data set. But it is
even true for the poorer countries. The input-output matrix for China is perhaps
the most different from the United States, but the overall structure is still similar.
Electricity shows up as being noticeably more important, and other business activ-
ities (which include advertising, accounting, and legal services) as somewhat less
important. These are the main differences.
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 makes these comparisons more systematically. It
shows the fraction of elements in the input-output matrix that differ by more than
0.02 from the corresponding elements in the U.S. input-output matrix. Just over 16
percent ofthe elements exceedthis difference in China’s input-output matrix, while
the corresponding number for Japan is about 9 percent. For this level of the cutoff,
the average across the 35 countries is 11 percent. If we lower the cutoff to 0.01, the
typical country has differences of this magnitude in just over 20 percent of the cells.
If we raise the cutoff to 0.05, the average across countries is 3.9 percent of cells.
Figure 8 shows the aggregate multipliers, ˜   for the 35 countries in our sample.
The averagevalueforthe multiplier inthis sampleis about1.9. Itrangesfrom ahigh
of 2.53 in China to lows of 1.51 in Greece and 1.59 in India. Interestingly, China and
India are two of the poorest countries in the sample, and they have widely different
multipliers. The multiplier forthe United Statesusingthis dataworks outtobe 1.77,
slightly higher than what we found in the 6-digit data.
Table 3 shows these multipliers in more detail, including the contribution from
imported intermediate goods aswellastheaggregate intermediate goods shareand
the “as if” share that corresponds to the multiplier computed using the Leontief
inverse. The simple approximation of “one over one minus the intermediate goods
share” does a very good job of approximating the true multiplier.
6.3. Take-away from the IO Data
What do we learn from the input-output data? Three things, I think. First, the com-
mon 1/1 − ¯ σ formula that emerges from simple models of intermediate goods is
remarkably robust: more careful analysis with full input-output structures across34 CHARLES I. JONES
Table 3: The Multiplier across a Range of Countries (48 Industries)
Fraction Overall “As If”
> .02 —— Multipliers —— Interm. Interm.
Country Different Domestic Import Total Share Share
China 0.161 2.21 1.14 2.53 0.63 0.61
Czech Republic 0.115 1.75 1.38 2.41 0.62 0.58
Slovak Republic 0.114 1.68 1.38 2.31 0.61 0.57
Hungary 0.107 1.53 1.38 2.10 0.60 0.52
Korea 0.109 1.72 1.22 2.10 0.58 0.52
Belgium 0.104 1.60 1.30 2.09 0.57 0.52
New Zealand 0.114 1.77 1.15 2.03 0.54 0.51
Poland 0.120 1.73 1.17 2.02 0.53 0.50
Finland 0.101 1.63 1.21 1.98 0.53 0.50
United Kingdom 0.096 1.72 1.14 1.95 0.51 0.49
Portugal 0.112 1.63 1.18 1.93 0.52 0.48
Australia 0.104 1.71 1.11 1.89 0.49 0.47
Sweden 0.096 1.57 1.21 1.89 0.51 0.47
Netherlands 0.096 1.54 1.22 1.89 0.51 0.47
Ireland 0.135 1.35 1.39 1.88 0.53 0.47
Spain 0.099 1.59 1.17 1.87 0.50 0.46
Italy 0.094 1.62 1.15 1.86 0.50 0.46
Austria 0.085 1.51 1.22 1.84 0.48 0.46
Taiwan 0.104 1.53 1.20 1.83 0.52 0.45
Japan 0.092 1.75 1.05 1.83 0.48 0.45
Brazil 0.109 1.69 1.07 1.81 0.48 0.45
Switzerland 0.151 1.54 1.17 1.81 0.49 0.45
Russia 0.242 1.63 1.11 1.80 0.47 0.45
Germany 0.104 1.58 1.14 1.80 0.49 0.44
France 0.104 1.63 1.10 1.79 0.48 0.44
Canada 0.087 1.52 1.18 1.79 0.48 0.44
United States 0.000 1.68 1.05 1.77 0.46 0.44
Norway 0.098 1.53 1.15 1.75 0.46 0.43
Indonesia 0.133 1.52 1.14 1.73 0.49 0.42
Denmark 0.098 1.48 1.15 1.70 0.43 0.41
Israel 0.106 1.49 1.10 1.63 0.41 0.39
Argentina 0.096 1.53 1.06 1.62 0.42 0.38
Turkey 0.114 1.43 1.11 1.59 0.41 0.37
India 0.153 1.49 1.07 1.59 0.44 0.37
Greece 0.114 1.37 1.10 1.51 0.38 0.34
Average 0.110 1.61 1.17 1.88 0.50 0.46
Note: The ﬁrst column reports the fraction of entries in a country’s input-output matrix that differ
from those in the U.S. matrix by more than 0.02.MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 35
Figure 8: The Multiplier across a Range of Countries (48 Industries)
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The ﬁgure plots the value of ˜ µ computed for each country against 2000 per capita
GDP from the Penn World Tables.
a range of economies suggest that the basic multiplier from simple models carries
over quite well. Working with simpler models, then, may be appropriate.
Second, there is a surprising degree of similarity in these matrices across coun-
tries. This is surprising in that one might haveexpected signiﬁcant differences both
for technological reasons and for reasons related to misallocation. On the techno-
logical front, countries at different levels of development presumably produce with
different technologies, and one might have expected to see this more strongly in
the input-output structure of these economies. This is particularly true given the
specialization arguments associated with international trade.
On the misallocation front, it should be appreciated that many distortions that
mightbepresentwouldshow upbychanging observedfactorshares,evenifthe un-
derlying technologies were the same. One way to see that is to recall the ﬁrst-order
condition in a simple neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas production:
(1 − τ)α Y
K = r. Firms rent capital until the post-distortion marginal product falls36 CHARLES I. JONES
to equal the rental rate. But in this case, rK/Y = α(1 − τ), so the observed capital
share will differ from the techological parameter by the distortion rate.
This in turn has important implications. There is a fundamental identiﬁcation
problem: we see data on observed intermediate goods shares, and we do not know
how to decompose that data into distortions and differences in technologies. This
identiﬁcation problem is not solved in anything I have done. Instead, I’ve simply
shown that the observed spending shares are remarkably similar across countries.
My tentative conclusion given this fact is that the misallocation across 4-digit
sectorsisnotparticularlylargeinthissampleofcountries. Withoutsolvingthebasic
identiﬁcation problem, however, this conclusion must remain tentative. One use-
ful way to check this would be to assume the U.S. input-output structure measures
the true technology for all countries, and to use observed spending shares on inter-
mediate goods to measure the distortions that apply on average across the 4-digit
sectors. This would be a valuable exercise. Of course, one could certainly question
the assumption that the underlying technologies in all countries are the U.S. fac-
tor shares. Moreover, this approach would not measure the distortions that apply
within each sector, which may be quite important in practice. Redoing the Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) analysis using gross output and intermediate goods within sec-
tors for China and India (and other countries) would also be valuable.
7. Conclusion
One of the most exciting directions in the growth literature in recent years has been
the recognition that the misallocation of resources at the micro level can aggregate
up to look like differences in total factor productivity. Quantifying these effects in
novel ways, two examples being the extensive use of ﬁrm-level data and the explo-
ration of input-output tables, is yielding new insights on why some countries are so
much richer than others and likely has a promising future.MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 37
A Appendix: Proofsof the Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Solving for Y and C
We begin by considering the proﬁt maximization problems for the ﬁnal goods
and intermediate goods ﬁrms. For the ﬁnal goods ﬁrms, recall that the problem is
max
{ci}
c
β1
1 · ... · c
βN
N −
N  
i=1
pici
This yields a FOC where the spending shares are the exponents:
pici
Y
= βi. (18)
Next, consider the intermediate ﬁrms:
max
{dij,mij},Ki,Hi
(1 − τi)piAi
 
K
αi
i H
1−αi
i
 1−σi−λi
d
σi1
i1 d
σi2
i2 · ... · d
σiN
iN m
λi1
i1 m
λi2
i2 · ... · m
λiN
iN
−
N  
j=1
pjdij −
N  
j=1
¯ pjmij − rKi − wHi,
The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are
(1 − τi)αi(1 − σi − λi)
piQi
Ki
= r (19)
(1 − τi)(1 − αi)(1 − σi − λi)
piQi
Hi
= w (20)
(1 − τi)σij
piQi
dij
= pj (21)
(1 − τi)λij
piQi
mij
= ¯ pj. (22)
Now we are ready to use these FOCs to solve for some allocations. Begin with
the resource constraint for sector j:
cj +
N  
i=1
dij = Qj.38 CHARLES I. JONES
Now use equation (21) to get rid of dij and rearrange slightly to get:
pjcj +
N  
i=1
(1 − τi)σijpiQi = pjQj.
Finally, from the ﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁnal goods ﬁrm that pj = βjY/cj. Us-
ing this expression for pj and canceling Y from both sides of the equation gives
βj +
N  
i=1
(1 − τi)σij
βiQi
ci
=
βjQj
cj
. (23)
Now, deﬁne vj ≡
βjQj
cj and let v denote the N ×1 vector of vj. Then we can stack
the N equations in (23) to get an equation involving vectors and a matrix:
β + ¯ B′v = v (24)
where β is the N × 1 vector of ﬁnal goods exponents and ¯ B is the N × N matrix of
intermediate goods shares adjusted for taxes: a typical element is (1 − τi)σij. This
equation solves easily to give
v∗ = (I − ¯ B′)−1β ≡ γ. (25)
Notice that this deﬁnes the solution for βjQj/cj as γj. It is easy to show in fact that
these elements are also the solution for pjQj/Y = γj, so that the γj terms are the
“Domar” weights — the ratio of total spending on intermediate good j to Y .
At this point, we can use this solution to get useful expressions for dij and mij as
well. Equation (18) implies that
pi
pj =
βi
βj ·
cj
ci. Substituting this into the FOC for dij
in (21) leads to
dij = (1 − τi)σij
γi
γj
· Qj. (26)
Similarly, mij satisﬁes
mij = (1 − τi)λijγiY/¯ pj. (27)MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 39
The FOCs for Ki and Hi similarly yield
Ki
K
=
(1 − τi)(1 − σi − λi)αiγi  
i(1 − τi)(1 − σi − λi)αiγi
≡ ¯ θKi (28)
and
Ki
K
=
(1 − τi)(1 − σi − λi)(1 − αi)γi  
i(1 − τi)(1 − σi − λi)(1 − αi)γi
≡ ¯ θHi. (29)
In this expression, the “bars” over the θs denote that these expressions include the
(1 − τi) terms in the numerator; this is useful below.
Now we can substitute the expressions in (26) through (29) back into the main
production function for intermediate goods. Factoring out the 1 − τi terms (and
letting the θKi ≡ ¯ θKi/(1 − τi)) gives
Qi = Ai(1 − τi)
 
(θKiK)α
i (θHiH)1−αi 1−σi−αi · ΠN
j=1 (σijQjγi/γj)
σij · ΠN
j=1 (λijγiY/¯ pj)
λij .
(30)
Taking logs of this expression, stacking into a vector, and using much of the no-
tation in Table 1 gives
q = ¯ a + ωq + δK logK + δH logH + Bq + λlogY, (31)
where q is the vector with typical element logQi, ¯ a is a vector with typical element
logAi(1 − τi), and B is the matrix of σij (see the table for the rest of the notation).
This equation can be solved to yield
q = (I − B)−1(¯ a + ωq + δK logK + δH logH + λlogY ) (32)
We will use this expression shortly. First, though, we go back to the ﬁnal goods
production function. Recallthatci = βiQi/γi. Takinglogsandstackingintoavector,
this gives
c = ωc + q (33)
where ωc is a vector with typical element logβi/γi and c denotes the vector of logci.
Then, from the ﬁnal goods production function and using the vector notation,40 CHARLES I. JONES
logY = β′c = β′ωc + β′q.
We are now at the last step. Substitute (32) into this last expression to get
logY = β′ωc + β′(I − B)−1(¯ a + ωq + δK logK + δH logH + λlogY ) (34)
Let Ai ≡ Aηi. This last equation can then be solved for logY to yield
logY = ˜  logA + ˜ αlogK + (1 − ˜ α)log H + logǫ (35)
where the notation used is that in Table 1.
The expression for consumption comes from using balanced trade and the ex-
pression for mij given in (22).
Proof of Proposition 2. The Multiplier in a Special Case
In matrix notation, the assumption that all sectors have a cumulative domestic
intermediate goods share of ˆ σ is simply B1 = ˆ σ1. This implies the following:
(I − B)1 = (1 − ˆ σ)1
1 = (I − B)−11 · (1 − ˆ σ)
1 = β′1 = β′(I − B)−11 · (1 − ˆ σ)
⇒ β′(I − B)−11 =
1
1 − ˆ σ
.
Similarly, β′(I − B)−1λ =
ˆ λ
1−ˆ σ. Therefore
 ′1 =
β′(I − B)−11
1 − β′(I − B)−1λ
=
1
1 − (ˆ σ + ˆ λ)
=
1
1 − ¯ σ
.
Proof of Proposition 3. Symmetry and Distortions
The key step in solving the model is to use the same general result as in the
previous proposition: if a matrix X has rows that sum to the same value, ¯ x, then
(I − X)−11 = 1 · 1
1−¯ x. In this case, this result is used in computing γ = (I − ¯ B′)−1β,MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 41
where βi = 1/N. Because of the symmetry, one obtains
γj = ˆ γ ≡
1/N
1 − σ(1 − ¯ τ)
.
Substituting this result into the FOCs, one gets
dij = (1 − ¯ τ)ˆ σQj/N
mij = (1 − ¯ τ)ˆ λ/Nˆ γY/¯ pj
as well as Ki/K = Hi/H = 1/N.
Using these condition to compute the allocation terms, one obtains
ωqi = −(1 − ˆ σ − ˆ λ)log(1 − ¯ τ) − ˆ λlog(1 − ˆ σ(1 − ¯ τ)) + Constant
where the constant does not depend on ¯ τ or on the sector i. In addition, β′ωc =
log(1 − ˆ σ(1 − ¯ τ)).
Following the deﬁnitions in Table 1, these expressions can be combined to yield
the allocation term:
ω = log(1 − ˆ σ(1 − ¯ τ)) − log(1 − ¯ τ) + Constant
for some other constant that does not depend on ¯ τ.
Substituting this into the deﬁnition of ǫ gives
logǫ = log(1 − ˆ σ(1 − ¯ τ)) +
ˆ σ + ˆ λ
1 − (ˆ σ + ˆ λ)
log(1 − ¯ τ) + Constant.
Furthermore, logY will have the same form.
Finally,weneedtogettheexpressionforGDP,C. Recallthatbecauseofbalanced
trade,
C = Y

1 −
N  
i=1
N  
j=1
(1 − τi)γiλij

.42 CHARLES I. JONES
Similar arguments to those above give
C = Y
 
1 − (ˆ σ + ˆ λ)(1 − ¯ τ)
1 − ˆ σ(1 − ¯ τ)
 
.
Substituting this into the expression for Y (or rather logǫ) above completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Symmetry with Random Distortions
This proof follows that for Proposition 3 fairly closely. The main exception turns
outto be ingetting the solution for  ′ℓ,where ℓdenotes the N ×1vectorwith typical
element log(1 − τi). This proceeds as follows. Using the fact that βi = 1/N
 ′ℓ =
1 − ˆ σ
1 − (ˆ σ + ˆ λ)
·
1
N
· 1′(I − B)−1ℓ (36)
Thekeystepis thentoshowthat1′(I−B)−1 = 1
1−ˆ σ ·1′. This canbeshownasfollows.
Let σ denote an N × 1 vector where each element is ˆ σ. Then, since B is an entire
matrix of ˆ σ, it follows that
1′B = σ′.
Then
1′ − 1′B = 1′ − σ′
and therefore
1′(I − B) = (1 − ˆ σ)1′.
Post-multiplying by (I − B)−1 and rearranging gives the result we wanted: 1′(I −
B)−1 = 1
1−ˆ σ · 1′. Once this is substituted into equation (36), one gets the expected
result that
 ′ℓ =
1
1 − (ˆ σ + ˆ λ)
·
1
N
 
i
log(1 − τi).MISALLOCATION AND INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMICS 43
Following the same arguments used in proving Proposition 3, one gets
logC = log(1 − (ˆ σ + ˆ λ)(1 − ¯ τ)) − log(1 − ¯ τ) +
1
1 − (ˆ σ + ˆ λ)
·
1
N
 
i
log(1 − τi) + Constant.
The rest of the proposition follows naturally from the log normal assumptions on
1 − τi.
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